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TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL, INC. v.
TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY: THE
REEMERGENCE OF PENN CENTRAL AND A HEALTHY
RELUCTANCE TO CRAFT PER SE REGULATORY
TAKINGS RULES
"It is true there is not enough beauty in the world. It is also true that I am not
competent to restore it. Neither is there candor, and here I may be of some use."1
I. INTRODUCTION
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,2 the Supreme Court held that a moratorium 3 on development imposed
during the process of devising a comprehensive land use plan did not constitute a
per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause 4 of the
United States Constitution. 5 The scope of Tahoe-Sierra, and thus its ultimate im-
pact on Supreme Court takings jurisprudence, had been severely narrowed and
redefined by the courts since the landowners first alleged a taking over fifteen
years 6 before the issue was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court. It is impor-
tant to note that this decision focused solely on Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council's
(the landowners) facial challenge to two consecutive moratoria 7 lasting for a pe-
riod of thirty-two months, enacted by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA)
during a planning process mandated by the States of Nevada and California.8
Recognizing Oliver Wendell Holmes's now famous declaration that "while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking," 9 the Court in this case rejected a per se takings approach
1. Louise Gluck, October, NEW YORKER, Oct. 28, 2002, at 93.
2. 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
3. A moratorium, or planning moratorium, is a tool used by governments to slow down devel-
opment to "assist jurisdictions in coming with land use plans for an area." Wendie L. Kellington,
Temporary Takings/Moratoria, SG021 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 105, 124 (2001). "Moratorium" is de-
fined as: "An authorized postponement, usu. a lengthy one, in the deadline for paying a debt or
performing an obligation .... The suspension of a specific activity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1026 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The final clause of the Fifth Amendment states "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." The Takings Clause is applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383
(1994).
5. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1489.
6. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226,
1229 (D. Nev. 1999).
7. TAHOE REG'L PLANNING AGENCY ORDINANCES 81-5 (1982) and Resolution 83-21 (1985).
8. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1472-73.
As the two states become aware of the environmental impacts that development was having on
the Tahoe Basin area, they enacted the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact (1968 Cal. Stat. 998 §
1; 1968 Nev. Stat. 4 (approved by Congress in 1969, Pub. L. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360)), which set
goals for the preservation and protection of the lake and created the TRPA, investing in it the
responsibility "to coordinate and regulate development in the Basin and to conserve its natural
resources." Id. at 1471.
9. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
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for regulations that temporarily reduce the value of property to zero. 10 Instead, the
Court reaffirmed the precedent of having "'generally eschewed' any set formula
for determining how far is too far," and chose instead to engage in an "'essentially
ad hoc, factual inquir[y]."' 11 Accordingly, the Court found that the circumstances
in this case are best analyzed by using the balancing test within the Penn Central
framework. 12
Tahoe-Sierra presented the Court with the opportunity to clarify the increas-
ingly muddy waters of federal takings law, especially that of temporary regulatory
takings. Instead, the unique set of facts pertinent to this case and the Court's reluc-
tance to go far beyond its now narrowed decision in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles13 has resulted in members of the plan-
ning and development communities professing wildly different interpretations, 14
and the flurry of commentary published after the decision had both sides claiming
partial victory. The title of one article asked "Will Moratoria Mania Result from
Tahoe?,"15 the National Association of Home Builders proclaimed that "morato-
rium on particular property could still be a taking," 16 and at the same time an
association of property owners heralded this case as "a substantial victory for local
10. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1489.
11. Id. at 1481 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)). It is
interesting to note that Justice Stevens pointedly cited Lucas's use of the Penn Central balanc-
ing test to describe the test, rather than cite directly to Penn Central. Id. In Lucas, Justice Scalia
begins with the Penn Central adage and then goes on to point out the exceptions. Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1015-16. In fact, later on in a footnote Justice Scalia argues that
the calculus in Penn Central regarding its determination of the diminution in value produced by
a municipal ordinance in light of the owner's total property holdings is "unsupportable." Id. at
1016 n.7. Justice Stevens's dissent in Lucas essentially follows his reasoning in Tahoe-Sierra-
Penn Central holds that regulatory takings analysis proceeds with an "ad hoc inquiry" together
with a balancing of private and public interests, and further, that categorical rules have little
support in past decisions. Id. at 1064-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. The Penn Central holding established several factors, including "the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations ... [and] the character of the governmental ac-
tion." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
13. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). For commentary published soon after First English was decided,
remarking on how it would likely be a landmark decision, see Gus Bauman, A True Landmark
Decision, LAND USE L. & ZONING DiG., Aug. 1987, at 3.
14. See generally Danaya C. Wright & Nissa Laughner, Shaken, Not Stirred: Has Tahoe-
Sierra Settled or Muddied the Regulatory Takings Waters?, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11177 (2002), WL
32 ELR 11177. Wright and Laughner, although pleased with the decision, argue that the Court
missed its chance to clarify regulatory takings jurisprudence and that it decided some of the
issues using incorrect analysis, including whether a facial challenge should be analyzed under
the Agins or Penn Central tests. Id. at *9.
15. Dwight H. Merriam, Will Moratoria Mania Result from Tahoe? The Length of the Mora-
torium Should Be the Shortest Possible to Get the Job Done, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 5, 2002, at 6
(arguing that although the Tahoe-Sierra case "contains strong, pro-planning dicta" and that "plan-
ners are justifiably gleeful," the decision is limited to its extraordinary facts). Id.
16. National Association of Home Builders, Supreme Court Decision in Tahoe-Sierra is Clear:
Moratorium on Particular Property Could Still be a Taking (Aug. 21, 2002), at http://
www.nahb.org/news-details.aspx?sectionlD=122&newslD=68 (noting that the enthusiastic re-
sponse planners have had to the decision is misplaced, as the Court made clear that a morato-
rium as applied to a particular property could require the payment of just compensation to the
owner under the Penn Central test) (on file with Maine Law Review).
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regulators." 17 This Note focuses on what, if any, guidance the Court's decision
gives to governments and planning professionals in fashioning moratoria to gain
time to "put [their] house in order . . . [and] adopt necessary controls or build
needed infrastructure." 8 Finally, this Note suggests that it is what the Court does
not say regarding how far is too far in temporary restrictions that is most signifi-
cant; by determining that a factual based, balancing approach as prescribed in Penn
Central is "better" than a per se rule, the Court truly exerts some candor into the
equation that seeks to balance the interests of the private landowners against the
protection of one of our Nation's natural treasures.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
"The texts underlying constitutional property are often much clearer.., than
its jurisprudential definitions." 19 This rather diplomatic yet undeniably accurate
characterization probably does a bit of disservice to the actual academic criticism,
which has labeled the Supreme Court regulatory takings jurisprudence as a "a vast
sea of uncertainty." 20 Modem regulatory takings law begins and ends with Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 1 where the Supreme Court recognized that a govern-
ment regulation could affect a taking, contrary to its previous holdings that the
takings clause only applied to a physical appropriation of property.2 2 In this case
the Court held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law that required mining compa-
nies to leave a portion of its underground coal unmined to act as a support for the
land's surface.23 This landmark decision set the course for a bifurcated takings
analysis: the Court began to plainly demarcate those cases in which a government
clearly took, used, prevented the use of, or was physically present on a private
property owner's land for the benefit of the public with per se rules (also known as
physical takings) and those cases like Pennsylvania Coal in which a government
17. Janet L. Holt, Moratoria Protecting Lake Tahoe Are Not Takings, TRIAL, Aug., 2002, at
68, 68. See also Richard A. Epstein, Takings by Slivers: Ruling Shows How Factional Politics
Can Survive Despite Constitutional Efforts to Limit Government Abuse by Protecting Property
Rights, NAT'L L.J., May 5, 2002, at A21.
18. ORLANDO E. DELOGU, MAINE LAND USE CONTROL LAW: CASES, NOTES, COMMENTS 349-50
(2d ed. 1997).
19. Gregory Daniel Page, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and Justice Scalia's Primer
on Property Rights: Advancing New Democratic Traditions by Defending the Tradition of Prop-
erty, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 161, 166 (2000).
20. Susan E. Spokes, Note, Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States: Tipping the Scales
in Favor of Private Property Rights at the Public's Expense, 47 ME. L. REV. 501, 503 (1995).
21. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
22. Id. at 415-16. See also Orlando E. Delogu, The Law of Taking Elsewhere and, One
Suspects, In Maine, 52 ME. L. REV. 324, 325 (2000). Indeed, until Pennsylvania Coal was
decided in 1922, a host of government regulations that sought to ameliorate incompatible uses
(such as building heights, zoning restrictions, and building material composition) were upheld
by the Supreme Court as justified within the police powers of the State. See generally Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (limitation on land use through implementa-
tion of city zoning ordinances); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (ban on the manu-
facturing of bricks in a residential setting); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (building
height regulations).
23. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415-16.
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regulation simply affected a property owner's use of land.24 Justice Holmes's
adage from Pennsylvania Coal that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking," 25 while originating the concept of regulatory taking, has set the course
for a body of law that has since struggled to define exactly what is "too far."
Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has "generally eschewed" finding a set
formula for determining how far is too far, and instead prefers to engage in "'es-
sentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.'"26 Consequently, the Court has crafted per se
or categorical rules only in tyo circumstances, 27 both of which further the con-
tinuum of physical takings. First, a regulation that required property owners to set
aside some space on their property for cable equipment, however small the physi-
cal intrusion may be, is a per se taking.28 The second type of categorical taking
was found in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,29 where, for the first time,
the Court established that a regulation that "deprives land of all economically ben-
eficial use" constitutes a taking regardless of any other factors, and thus requires
government compensation. 30 However, the Court pointed out that the holding was
limited to situations where the diminution of value was one hundred percent, and
would not apply in cases as close as ninety-five percent.3 1
The Court first articulated its "ad hoc inquiry" preference in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,32 which provides the now standard regula-
tory takings test. 33 In determining that New York City's historic preservation laws
could be used to prevent the owners of Grand Central Station from erecting mod-
ernist towers in its airspace, the Penn Central Court established three criteria to
examine in a takings analysis: (1) the regulation's economic impact on the prop-
erty owner; (2) the regulation's interference with distinct, investment-backed ex-
pectations; and (3) the character of the government action. 34 Since that decision,
the Court has embarked on a long process of attempting to clarify the Penn Central
test, with varying degrees of success. In Agins v. City of Tiburon,35 the Court
added to the test by determining that the governmental action must "substantially
advance legitimate state interests" and must not "den[y] an owner economically
viable use of his land."'36
24. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that
a statute mandating that cable lines be placed on private buildings was a physical occupation of
property that required just compensation); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015 (1992) (holding that when a government regulation denies an owner all economi-
cally beneficial or productive use of his land, a categorical taking occurs).
25. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
26. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1478
(2002) (quoting Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
27. Delogu, supra note 22, at 329-30.
28. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. at 421.
29. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
30. Id. at 1027.
31. Id. at 1019n.8.
32. 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
33. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1489
(2002).
34. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 124.
35. 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (finding that a city zoning ordinance limiting the number of resi-
dences that can be built on a given lot was not facially unconstitutional).
36. Id. at 260.
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The first prong of the Agins test has not been particularly difficult for govern-
ments to overcome when regulations have been adopted in good faith in consider-
ation of the public's health, safety, or general welfare. 37 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has articulated a "deferential standard of review" and has found that a state
need not articulate the actual objective behind the scheme or submit evidence to
support the rationality of the regulation, provided that the courts can conceive of
facts that reasonably justify the regulation at issue. 38 However, in Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission,39 the Court further "clarified" the Penn Central "gov-
ernmental purpose" requirement to require not only a legitimate state interest, but
also an "essential nexus" between what a regulation purports to accomplish and
what the developer or land owner is doing.4 0 Thus, the Nollan Court did not find
a nexus between the development approval of a coastal homeowner's house reno-
vation and the condition imposed upon it of granting a shoreline passageway to the
public, and thus the Court found a taking because the condition was unrelated to
the building of the house. 4 1 A few years later, in Dolan v. City of Tigard,42 the
Court added to this "purpose" safeguard by determining that after a "nexus" had
been found, the regulation also must not overly burden the property owner relative
to the impact of the proposed development. 43 This "rough proportionality" or
reasonable relationship standard in fact speaks to fairness and scale in enforcing
governmental regulation. 44
The economic elements of the test are more muddied.4 5 The aforementioned
"economically viable diminution in value" and "interference with distinct, invest-
ment backed expectations" components must be examined first by determining
what exactly the parcel in question is. The Penn Central opinion, although while
not overruling Pennsylvania Coal, disagreed with Holmes in one substantial way:
takings analysis must focus on the "whole parcel" and not just be limited to merely
the regulated portion or interest in property.46 Thus any diminution in value must
be considered in light of the entire bundle of sticks of rights that a property interest
entails, including the "estate" sticks (such the right to use, possess, and exclude) as
well as the more abstract sticks such as vertical (surface and air rights), horizontal
(all contiguously owned property considered separately or within types of land
such as wetland), and temporal rights (present and future interests along a
37. Delogu, supra note 22, at 330.
38. FCC v. Beach Commun. Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993).
39. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
40. Id. at 836-37.
41. Id.
42. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
43. Id. at 390-91.
44. Delogu, supra note 22, at 335.
45. See William W. Wade, Economic Backbone of the Penn Central TestAfter Florida Rock V,
K&K, and Palazzolo, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11221 (2002), WL 32 ELR 11221, *2, *9 (pointing out
that although Penn Central outlines several economic considerations to determine if compensa-
tion is due, the courts have confounded the "reasonable expectations vis-t-vis plaintiffs' notice
of regulatory prohibitions versus expected return on investments," and that "[flinancial tools to
reveal frustration of investment-backed expectations produce clear results in the hands of trained
legal and economic analysts").
46. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
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timeline). 47 The requirement to look at the parcel as a whole as part of a takings
balancing analysis is truly the penultimate factor in Tahoe-Sierra. Certainly, the
future interest that still exists in so-called temporary takings, however tenuous, is
still an interest. In a decision that may have added more confusion than clarity to
the concept of temporal rights within a takings analysis, the Court determined in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles4 8 that "'tem-
porary takings' which.., deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different
in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires com-
pensation."'4 9 However, that case, in which the Court looked at a development
moratoria affecting rebuilding a campground in a floodplain, was limited to the
question of whether compensation was available in temporary takings. 50 It did
not, as the Tahoe-Sierra Court pointed out, decide the question of what exactly
constitutes a temporary taking itself.5 1
Finally, in a case decided just a year before Tahoe-Sierra, the Supreme Court
in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island52 upheld a property owner's ability to challenge wet-
land regulations that were in place prior to his individual ownership. 53 This hold-
ing was anchored in the principle that a state's right to restrict use of property is
based on reasonableness, and barring successive property owners from claiming a
taking would leave no avenue to challenge arguably unreasonable regulations that
may have simply been unchallenged in the past.54 However, the Court still em-
braced the Penn Central test as the central takings analysis, 55 and Justice O'Connor
in a concurrence emphasized that several factors have significance in a proper
takings balancing test. 56 Although the property owner did not recover compensa-
tion on remand under the Penn Central test, many environmentalists have viewed
this opinion as opening a floodgate of litigation that would have "a chilling effect
on government efforts to promulgate environmental regulations and limit environ-
mental protections on fragile ecosystems."'5 7 This Note will argue that, in light of
Tahoe-Sierra and its embrace of Justice O'Connor's moderating concurrence in
47. Dan Herber, Surviving the View Through the Lockner Looking Glass: Tahoe-Sierra and
the Case for Upholding Development Moratoria, 86 MINN. L. REv. 913, 925-26 (2002) (arguing
that because Penn Central adopted Pennsylvania Coal's holding that regulations that go "too
far" are compensable, the "too far" determination hinges on whether the regulated property
encompasses all or simply a part of the severed property).
48. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
49. Id. at 318.
50. Id. at 307-08.
51. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1482
(2002).
52. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
53. Id. at 630.
54. Id. at 627.
55. Id. at 630.
56. Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Courtney Harrington, Penn Central to Palazzolo: Regulatory Takings Decisions and Their
Implications for the Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 383, 397 (2002)
(arguing that although it is too early to tell, the impact of Palazzolo would likely be that states
will be more cautious when choosing environmental policy).
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Palazzolo, all is not yet lost.5 8
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF TAHOE-SIERRA
A. Background Facts
The relevant facts of the case are undisputed. 59 Lake Tahoe, the beauty at the
root of this litigation, is widely thought to be "indescribably beautiful,"'60 and has
been proclaimed by President Clinton to be "a national treasure that must be pro-
tected and preserved. '6 1 Perhaps best known for the clarity of its waters, due to
the lack of algae that can discolor other lakes,6 2 the lake that has been described by
Mark Twain as "a noble sheet of blue water ' 6 3 had deteriorated over the past forty
years due to the explosion of development around the Basin.
In response to the increased nutrient loading of the lake, caused by the spread
of impervious coverage of land due to burgeoning development, the States of Ne-
vada and California adopted the Tahoe-Regional Planning Compact, 64 which cre-
ated the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA). The goals of TRPA were to
protect and preserve the lake and to "coordinate and regulate development in the
Basin and to conserve its natural resources." '6 5 After drafting a plan in 1972 that
allowed numerous exceptions and did not have a significant effect on the pace of
development, the Compact was amended by the two states with the approval of the
President and Congress on December 19, 1980.66 The amended Compact man-
58. For an interesting exploration of the Court's recent takings holdings in light of the in-
creasing interconnectedness between land use controls and environmental protection, see Michael
Allan Wolf, Earning Deference: Reflections on the Merger of Environmental and Land-Use
Law, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11190 (2002), WL 32 ELR 11190, *1-3 (arguing, inter alia, that the
traditional deference that courts had given to local officials to craft regulations that protect the
public health and safety through environmental ordinances has been eroded due to the Supreme
Court's mudd[ying] of regulatory takings law); see also Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf,
Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158,2184-85 (2002)
(pointing out examples of antienvironmental bias in Nollan and Dolan and that when asking
"does the challenged regulation substantially advance legitimate governmental interests[]" those
Justices who wrote the aforementioned opinions "do not hesitate to reject expert-based find-
ings").
59. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1470
(2002).
60. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226,
1230 (D. Nev. 1999).
61. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1470.
62. Id. at 1471.
63. Id. (quoting MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 169 (1st ed., Hippocrene Books, n.d.) (1872)).
Mark Twain describes the lake as:
[A] noble sheet of blue water lifted six thousand three hundred feet above the level of
the sea, and walled in by a rim of snowclad mountain peaks that towered aloft full
three thousand feet higher still! ... As it lay there with the shadows of the mountains
brilliantly photographed upon its still surface I thought it must be the fairest picture
the whole earth affords.
MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 169 (1st ed., Hippocrene Books, n.d.) (1872).
64. See sources cited supra note 8.
65. See sources cited supra note 8.
66. Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 66801 (West Supp. 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. § 277.200 (1980).
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dated the development of "[e]nvironmental [t]hreshold [c]arrying [c]apacities, ..
[including] standards for air quality, water quality, soil conservation, vegetation
and noise,"'6 7 within eighteen months, and that an amended plan shall be adopted
within one year after the standards are adopted.6 8 Most important to the case at
issue, the Compact stated that it may be "necessary to halt temporarily works of
development in the region which might otherwise absorb the entire capability of
the region for further development or direct it out of harmony with the ultimate
plan."'6 9 In addition to the standards mandated by the Compact, the TRPA at this
time was also working on the development of water quality standards in order to
comply with the Clean Water Act, and found that it would be unable to meet the
deadlines in the Compact. 70 In response, TRPA enacted Ordinance 81-5, the first
of the two moratoria at issue in Tahoe-Sierra, which banned all construction and
activity within designated "Stream Environment Zones" (SEZ) in California and
Nevada, and also banned activity in other more sensitive "high hazard" lands in
California within the Basin during the period from August 24, 1981, until the
completion of the final plan.7 1 Although finally adopting thresholds on August
26, 1982, the TRPA was unable to enact a regional plan within a year as mandated
by the Compact. 72 Consequently, TRPA adopted Resolution 83-21 on November
26, 1983, the second moratoria at issue in this case, which halted all project review
approvals on "high hazard" land in both states for an additional eight months.7 3
By the time a regional plan was adopted on April 26, 1984, the two moratoria
combined prevented development on "high hazard" lands in California and SEZ
lands in both states for a total of thirty-two months, and for "high hazard" land
within Nevada for eight months.74 Two months after the adoption of the regional
plan in 1984, 75 the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, a nonprofit corporation
representing some 2000 property owners including 400 owners of property within
the affected areas, filed suit in the federal district courts in Nevada and California,
alleging that the moratoria constituted takings of their property without just com-
pensation.76
B. Procedure and Majority Decision
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,7 7 after ten years, a consolidation from the two district courts, three pub-
67. Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233, 3235, 3239-40
(1980).
68. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1472.
69. Id. (quoting Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233, 3243
(1980)). Until the adoption of the final plan, the Compact prohibited the development of new
subdivisions, condominiums, and apartment buildings. Id.
70. Id. at 1472-73.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1473.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Shortly after the 1984 plan was adopted, the State of California sought and received an
injunction to block its implementation. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, No. Civ. S-84-
0565 EJG (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1984). This injunction remained in place until a revised plan was
adopted in 1987. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F Supp.
2d 1226, 1236 (D. Nev. 1999).
76. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1474.
77. 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Nev. 1999).
20031
lished Ninth Circuit opinions, 78 and at least five district court opinions and or-
ders,79 the present case commenced after having been severely narrowed by those
earlier decisions. 80 This case ultimately became a facial challenge: whether the
two moratoria of thirty-two months constituted a taking of property.
The United States District Court of the District of Nevada's analysis began by
recognizing the uniqueness and beauty of Lake Tahoe. 8 1 First, the court acknowl-
edged that the constitutional interest at stake was whether the landowners' land
had been subjected to a regulatory taking. 82 The District Court stated that under
the Agins v. City of Tiburon83 test, government regulation would be seen as going
"too far" if either (1) it does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest or
(2) it denies the owner economically viable use of her land. 84 The court quickly
disposed of the first prong of the test, determining that under the Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Commission85 and Dolan v. City of Tigard86 essential nexus/rough
proportionality standard, 87 further development on the landowners' property would
significantly impact the environmental quality of the lake, and any less severe
response would not adequately address the environmental degradation problems. 88
78. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F.3d 753 (9th
Cir. 1994); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 938 F.2d 153 (9th
Cir. 1991); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331 (9th
Cir. 1990).
79. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d
1226 (D. Nev. 1999); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 992 F.
Supp. 1218 (D. Nev. 1998); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
808 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Nev. 1992); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 638 F. Supp. 126 (D. Nev. 1986); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan-
ning Agency, 611 F. Supp. 110 (D. Nev. 1985).
80. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
In earlier proceedings, the landowners had been grouped in separate classes based on which
areas they lived in, and the entire period from the first moratorium to the final amended plan
adoption in 1987 was originally at issue. However, through procedural and statute of limitations
grounds, the plaintiffs were consolidated and the focus of the case became the period of the two
moratoria. Id. at 1237-38.
81. As noted above, both the District Court and the Supreme Court quoted Mark Twain's
description of Lake Tahoe extensively. See supra note 66. The District Court further cited
Twain approvingly:
... [the lake] was glassy and clear, or rippled and breezy, or black and storm-tossed,
according to Nature's mood; and its circling border of mountain domes, clothed with
forests, scarred with land-slides, cloven by canons and valleys, and helmeted with
glittering snow, fitly framed and finished the noble picture. The eye was never so
tired of gazing, day or night, in calm or storm; it suffered but one grief, and that was
that it could not look always, but must close sometimes in sleep.
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (quot-
ing TWAIN, supra note 66, at 173).
82. Id. at 1238.
83. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
84. Id. at 260.
85. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
86. 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994).
87. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F Supp. 2d at 1239.
88. Id. at 1239-40. Before engaging in the nexus/rough proportionality analysis, the court
suggested that Dolan/Nollan may not apply at all to facial challenges like this case due to the
holding in Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the Supreme
Court did resolve this question in its decision.
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However, under the second prong of the Agins test, the court applied a Penn Cen-
tral analysis to determine whether there had been either a temporary taking or a
total taking. 89 Under a temporary takings analysis, the court determined that, given
an average preconstruction holding time of a lot in the Lake Tahoe region of twenty-
five years, the landowners did not have "reasonable, investment backed expecta-
tions" that they would have been able to build during the time of the moratoria. 90
However, the court did find that, although some value remained in the property
during the moratoria, the landowners had temporarily been deprived of "all eco-
nomically viable use of their land," and the moratorium was thus a categorical per
se taking under the Lucas decision.9 1
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the only
issue raised by the landowners was whether Lucas applied and whether the mora-
toria denied the landowners all economically viable use of their land.92 The land-
owners did not challenge that, under the Penn Central "ad hoc balancing approach,"
there would be no taking.9 3 Concluding that property interests have many dimen-
sions, including a physical dimension (size and shape), a functional dimension
(extent of use allowed), and a temporal dimension (duration of property interests),
the Ninth Circuit found that the Lucas test applied to the "relatively rare" case in
which a regulation denied all productive use of a property, whereas the moratoria
in question only affected the "temporal slice" of the fee interest.94 The Ninth
Circuit stated that regulatory takings jurisprudence focuses on the impact of the
regulation as a whole and further, that moratoria are a form of regulation that was
widespread and well established. 95 Finally, the court rejected the landowners'
claim that First English was controlling, determining that First English was lim-
ited to whether compensation would be available for a temporary taking, and only
if a court reached a finding that a temporary taking had indeed occurred. 96 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the proper test to determine whether a temporary
taking had occurred was the Penn Central balancing approach and overturned the
District Court in favor of TRPA. 97
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the landowners' facial attack
on the two moratoria contended that the "mere enactment of a temporary regula-
tion that, while in effect, denies a property owner all viable economic use of her
property gives rise to an unqualified constitutional obligation to compensate her
for the value of its use during that period." 9 8 The property owners relied on First
English and Lucas, both regulatory takings cases, to argue for a categorical rule
that such a temporary deprivation, regardless of the length of time, is a per se
taking. 99 Finally, the property owners argued that the Takings Clause was "de-
89. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1470
(2002).
90. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. at 1240-41.
91. Id. at 1245.
92. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 766 (9th
Cir. 2000).
93. Id. at 773.
94. Id. at 774.
95. Id. at 775-77.
96. Id. at 778.
97. ld.
98. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1477
(2002).
99. Id. at 1478.
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signed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 100
The Court disagreed. The Court began its analysis much as the district court
did by recognizing the exceptionality of this case due to the national treasure that
is Lake Tahoe, whose clear waters are "not merely transparent, but dazzlingly,
brilliantly so."101 First, the Court recognized the long standing use of per se rules
when government condemns or physically appropriates private property for a pub-
lic purpose. 102 However, the Court pointed out that there is a real distinction
between acquisitions of property for public purpose and regulations prohibiting
private uses, and it is inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as
precedent for analysis of a claim of regulatory takings. 103 Thus, proceeding along
a regulatory takings analysis, and from the outset recognizing that land use regula-
tions and planning tools such as moratoria are ubiquitous and useful and to treat
them as takings would "transform government regulation into a luxury few gov-
ernments could afford," 104 the Court found that Lucas was inappropriate in this
case. 105
Resisting the temptation to adopt per se rules in cases involving partial regula-
tory takings, the Court instead affirmed the Penn Central analysis of examining "a
number of factors" that focus on the "parcel as a whole."'10 6 The Court noted that
the requirement that "'the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety"' in regulatory
takings cases had become a cornerstone of analysis, and approvingly cited Andrus
v. Allard, 10 7 where the Court found that "where an owner possesses a full 'bundle'
of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking." 10 8
Thus, in Lucas, where an "unconditional and permanent" regulation that "rendered
valueless" the residential lots in question was found to be a per se taking, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the holding in Lucas was limited to "'the extraor-
dinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of the
land is permitted. ' ' 109 However, the Court determined that a thirty-two month
segment cannot be severed from a fee simple estate under the Penn Central ap-
proach, and thus the district court erred in disaggregating the property into tempo-
100. Id. (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
101. Id. at 1471 (quoting TWAIN, supra note 66, at 174-75.) The full quote reads:
So singularly clear was the water, that where it was only twenty or thirty feet deep the
bottom was so perfectly distinct that the boat seemed floating in the air! Yes, where it
was even eighty feet deep. Every little pebble was distinct, every speckled trout,
every hand's breadth of sand .... Down through the transparency of these great
depths, the water was not merely transparent, but dazzlingly, brilliantly so. All ob-
jects seen through it had a bright, strong vividness, not only of outline, but of every
minute detail, which they would not have had when seen simply through the same
depth of atmosphere. So empty and airy did all the spaces seem below us, and so
strong was the sense of floating high aloft in midnothingness, that we called these
boat-excursions "balloon-voyages."
102. Id. at 1478.
103. Id. at 1479.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1480.
106. Id. at 1481.
107. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
108. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'i Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1481
(quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 65-66).
109. Id. at 1483 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992)).
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ral segments corresponding to the regulations at issue. 110 Ultimately, the Court
embraced a fact specific inquiry as the default rule in regulatory takings cases, and
categorized Lucas as appropriate only in "extraordinary case[s]." 1 1
The Court also quickly disposed of the landowners' contention that First En-
glish supported a per se temporary takings rule. 112 Finding that the First English
decision was specifically related to the availability of compensation, the Court
quoted its "unambiguous" determination: "We merely hold that where the
government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no
subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compen-
sation for the period during which the taking was effective."1 13 In fact, the Court
noted that First English expressly limited the holding to the facts presented in
First English and recognized that, if the question of "normal delays in obtaining
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like" were be-
fore the First English Court, a different inquiry would take place. 114 Thus, the
Tahoe-Sierra Court rejected the contention that a new categorical rule crafted from
First English applied here. 115
Finally, in dealing with the property owners' contention that concepts of "fair-
ness and justice" 116 would be best served by a categorical rule, the Court deter-
mined that the rule that government was required to pay compensation for every
delay in the use of property "would render routine government processes prohibi-
tively expensive or encourage hasty decisionmaking." 117 The Court quoted Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,118 where she
stated that the "fairness and justice" concept was less than fully determinate; thus
any analysis under it must "eschew any set formula" and instead the outcome would
depend largely "upon the particular circumstances [of the] case." 119 Here, the
Court understood that moratoria like those used by the TRPA are widely recog-
nized as an effective tool to preserve the status quo during development of a per-
manent development strategy, and are essential to "informed decisionmaking."' 120
Otherwise, the Court determined, landowners will have incentives to quickly de-
velop their property before comprehensive plans are enacted, thereby "fostering
inefficient and ill-conceived growth."' 12 1 In conclusion, the Court determined that
an interest in "fairness and justice" would be best served by relying on the Penn
Central approach, rather than a per se rule. 122
110. Id. at 1483-84. Justice Stevens points out that Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis "makes
the same mistake by carving out a 6-year interest in the property, rather than considering the
parcel as a whole, and treating the regulations covering that segment as analogous to a total
taking under Lucas." Id. at 1484 n.26.
111. Id. at 1484.
112. Id. at 1482.
113. Id. (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (emphasis added)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1484 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
117. Id. at 1485.
118. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
119. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1486.
120. Id. at 1487.
121. Id. at 1488.
122. Id. at 1489.
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C. The Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, 123 rejected the majority's fo-
cus on the thirty-two month moratoria period, and instead looked at the six-year
period that included the permanent injunction placed on the 1984 plan that lasted
until 1987.124 Thus, stating the proposition that "a court cannot determine whether
a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes,",1 2 5 the
dissent found that regardless of "proximate causation," (i.e., a court-enforced in-
junction or an agency-imposed moratorium), the TRPA was undoubtedly the "mov-
ing force" behind the landowners' inability to use their land during the six-year
period. 126 Under that rationale, the dissent contended that the six-year period was
the correct period to examine for a takings claim. 12 7
The dissent argued that the Lucas rule applied here because even the morato-
ria examined alone "did in fact deny the landowners all economically viable use of
their land." 12 8 Finding that the distinctions between "temporary" and "perma-
nent" were tenuous in a prohibition on building that lasted six years, the dissent
noted that in Lucas, the "permanent" regulation ended up lasting only two years
before being amended by the South Carolina Legislature. 129 Since "land-use regu-
lations are not irrevocable," the dissent was wary that the majority's opinion would
give governments an incentive to simply label a regulation "temporary" to escape
the finding of a taking. 130
Next, the dissent insisted that First English would apply to the case at hand, as
that case found that "temporary takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of
his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Con-
stitution clearly requires compensation." 13 1 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued that when all economically beneficial or productive use of land has been
taken away from a land owner, it is the functional equivalent of a physical appro-
priation.132 Finally, the dissent suggested that the majority's concern that a Lucas
application here would put traditional planning devices in danger of being takings
was unfounded given First English's admonition that a temporary taking did not
apply "in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zon-
ing ordinances, and the like." 133 However, because this six-year moratorium "far
exceeds" ordinary moratoria and "is not one of the longstanding, implied limita-
tions of property law," the dissent argued that a per se rule regarding whether
moratoria that prohibit all economic use of property need not be applied here. 134
123. Id. at 1490. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissent, and Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas joined.
124. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,
477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986)).
126. Id. at 1491 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), which held that a § 1983 causation is established when a
government action is the "moving force" behind an alleged constitutional action).
127. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing the findings of fact in the Tahoe-Sierra district
court, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1245 (D. Nev. 1999)).
129. Id. at 1492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987)).
132. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1495 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent that took issue with the majority's
conclusion that a temporary moratorium could not be a taking because it was not"a taking of the parcel as a whole." 135 In fact, Justice Thomas seemed to read the
Court's recent decisions as putting aside the differences between temporary and
permanent takings when a landowner is "deprived of all beneficial use of his land,"
regardless of whether a regulation affected only a "temporal slice" of property. 136
Justice Thomas insisted that a taking occurred in this case and argued that "regula-
tions prohibiting all productive uses of property are subject to Lucas' per se rule,
regardless of whether the property so burdened retains theoretical useful life and
value if, and when, the 'temporary' moratorium is lifted."'137
IV. DISCUSSION
Although environmentalists and commentators have begun to interpret Tahoe-
Sierra as a major step towards opening the door for regulation that mandates eco-
stewardship of land13 8 and as a reinterpretation of the Lucas and First English
holdings, 139 this Note suggests that perhaps not all has changed. In fact, it appears
that the Court has not gone nearly as far as property rights activists feared, or as
proponents of land use regulations wished. 140 Three issues examined in the con-
135. Id. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Justice Thomas stated that the
majority's opinion went against the recent tide of takings jurisprudence. The footnote reads:
The majority's decision to embrace the "parcel as a whole" doctrine as settled is puz-
zling. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. at 631, (noting that the Court has
"at times expressed discomfort with the logic of [the parcel as a whole] rule"); Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1016, n.7, (recognizing that "uncer-
tainly regarding the composition of the denominator in [the Court's] 'deprivation'
fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court," and that the rel-
evant calculus is a "difficult question").
Id. at 1496 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This appears to miss the ultimate fact that the Court,
however "discomfort[ed]" or "inconsistent," has not abandoned the Penn Central approach. In
fact, each of those two decisions ultimately embrace it, and as the majority points out in this
case, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Palazollo states, "Our polestar instead remains
the principles set forth in Penn Central itself and our other cases that govern partial regulatory
takings. Under these cases, interference with investment-backed expectations is one of a num-
ber of factors that a court must examine." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 601, 633 (2001)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1497 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
138. Robert J. Goldstein, The Future of Environmental Law: Adjusting Expectations After
Tahoe-Sierra, 19 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 489, 491 (2002).
139. J. David Breemer, Temporary Insanity: The Long Tale of Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council
and Its Quiet Ending in the United States Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 54 (2002).
140. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1350-52 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(holding although Tahoe is the starting point for analyzing temporary moratoria, it does not
apply in cases where ripeness is at issue); State ex rel. Shemo v. City of Mayfield Heights, 775
N.E.2d 493, 496-97 (Ohio 2002) (where, the day before Tahoe was decided, property owners
were awarded compensation for a temporary taking due to the unconstitutionality of a zoning
restriction, on appeal the court determined that even if Tahoe would apply and a Penn Central
test should be used, there would not be a different result when the regulation did not substan-
tially advance a legitimate state interest). Cf. ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND-USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 9 (1999) (arguing that
past decisions that have been hailed as great victories for property rights have essentially been
interpreted as doctrinally cautious and are often limited in application).
2003]
text of this litigation illustrate that the future of regulatory takings has perhaps not
been altered, but instead continues along much the same path as before, perhaps
even strengthened by being rooted back to the seminal "rules": (1) the landown-
ers' legal strategy in light of regulatory takings precedent; (2) the uniqueness of
the Tahoe Basin and the limited time frame focused on by the Court; and (3) a
reaffirmation of the Penn Central balancing test in light of Tahoe-Sierra. These
issues, all touched upon by the majority, demonstrate that although regulatory tak-
ings jurisprudence was not clarified as hoped for by this decision, the Court feels
comfortable with its current path. Ultimately, the central tenets of takings law
were left untouched, and the importance in this case lies more in what the Court
did not say than what it did.
A. Pushing the Envelope Too Far: Moratoria and a General Reluctance in Crafting
Per Se Rules
The landowners' central argument in this case was that a "temporary taking"
is a taking requiring compensation like any other taking, and that "a 'police power'
freeze on use of vacant land and an 'eminent domain' taking are functionally and
constitutionally the same." 14 1 By advocating that temporary development mora-
toria should trigger a per se takings rule, the landowners overplayed their hand and
misinterpreted the line of cases used in their reasoning. The Court has long main-
tained that per se rules in regulatory takings law are rarely created and often lim-
ited in application. 142 Indeed, the Court is doctrinally cautious when proceeding
along takings lines in general, 143 and to ask the Court to stretch Lucas's categori-
cal taking rule for when "all economically viable use" of property is restricted,
regardless of how long, was too much to ask of this Court.
Besides not properly understanding the Court's general reluctance to craft per
se rules, 144 the argument that this new categorical rule should be applied to the
concept of moratoria was a related flaw in the landowners' appeal. Surely, the
courts have long held valid the tools used for planning purposes, although often
impacting property values in tangential ways.145 Moratoria, one of many tools in
141. Brief for Petitioner at 36, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (No. 00-1167). In oral argument, Justice Breyer questioned the
landowners' council, asking if a moratoria "would have ... reduced the value of the land by 5,
10 percent... why.., should the public have to give compensation for that small diminution in
value?" Attorney Berger responded "[b]ecause it's not the diminution in value that we're talk-
ing about .... It's the total elimination of the ability to make use of the property." Oral
Argument, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465
(2002) (No. 00-1167), available at 2002 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 2 at *5-6 (Jan. 7, 2002).
142. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 140, at 9.
143. Id.
144. E.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 635-36 (2001) (stating that "the tempta-
tion to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted").
145. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1497
(2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the planner's belt, are found at all levels of government, 146 and though not the
most commonly used, they are upheld more often than not. 147 They are often
critical in developing reasoned, forward thinking comprehensive plans in areas
that experience greater than anticipated development pressures that overly burden
the current infrastructure and/or carrying capacity of natural resources, and are
usually limited in duration by statute. 148 Here, the Tahoe Basin is undeniably one
of the most unique and beautiful locations in the country, 149 and random develop-
ment patterns had been threatening the quality and clarity of the lake. To ask the
Court to potentially allow this popular and important natural area to undergo de-
velopment without a well-reasoned plan was too much for the Court. Tahoe's
146. In fact, a number of states have enacted statutes that authorize the use of moratoria, and
in some cases impose specific time limits. The majority opinion in footnote 37 listed several,
including: CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65858 (West Supp. 2002) (moratoria allowed up to two years);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-121 (2001) (six months); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.201 (Michie 2001)
(one year); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 125.215 (West 2001) (three years); MINN. STAT. § 394.34
(West 2000) (two years); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:23 (2001) (one year); ORE. REv. STAT. §
197.520 (1997) (ten months); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 11-2-10 (Michie 2001) (two years); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 17-27-404 (1995) (eighteen months); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.63.200 (West
2001) (two years); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 62.23(7)(d) (West 2001) (two years). See also 30-A M.R.S.A.
§ 4356 (1996) (180 days). But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-90(a) (West 2002) ("The prohibi-
tion of development in order to prepare a master plan and development regulations is prohib-
ited.").
147. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 140, at 273.
148. California's statute allows for a two-year moratorium, which must be tied to public
health and safety. The relevant portion of CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65858 follows:
§65858. Interim ordinance; adoption or extension; expiration; subsequent ordinance;
definitions
(a) Without following the procedures otherwise required prior to the adoption of a
zoning ordinance, the legislative body of a county, city, including a charter city, or
city and county, to protect the public safety, health, and welfare, may adopt as an
urgency measure an interim ordinance prohibiting any uses that may be in conflict
with a contemplated general plan, specific plan, or zoning proposal that the legisla-
tive body, planning commission or the planning department is considering or study-
ing or intends to study within a reasonable time. That urgency measure shall require
a four-fifths vote of the legislative body for adoption. The interim ordinance shall be
of no further force and effect 45 days from its date of adoption. After notice pursuant
to Section 65090 and public hearing, the legislative body may extend the interim
ordinance for 10 months and 15 days and subsequently extend the interim ordinance
for one year. Any extension shall also require a four-fifths vote for adoption. Not
more than two extensions may be adopted.
(b) Alternatively, an interim ordinance may be adopted by a four-fifths vote follow-
ing notice pursuant to Section 65090 and public hearing, in which case it shall be of
nor further force and effect 45 days from its date of adoption. After notice pursuant to
Section 65090 and public hearing, the legislative body may by a four-fifths vote ex-
tend the interim ordinance for 22 months and 15 days.
(c) The legislative body shall not adopt or extend any interim ordinance pursuant to
this section unless the ordinance contains legislative findings that there is a current
and immediate threat to the public health, safety, or welfare, and the approval of addi-
tional subdivisions, use permits, variances, buildings permits, or any other applicable
entitlement for use which is required in order to comply with a zoning ordinance
would result in that threat to public health, safety, or welfare ....
CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65858 (West Supp. 2002).
149. See supra notes 66, 84 & 104 and accompanying text. The majority went to great
lengths to point out the unique character of Lake Tahoe, and the particular circumstances that
gave rise to the need for a regional planning agency in this area in the first place.
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"uniqueness" will ultimately limit the holding of the case, and should send a signal
to planners that moratoria of this magnitude must be for a significant purpose.
When the landowners and amici1 50 asked the Court to examine moratoria, an
unintended consequence was that the Court properly read Lucas's holding as ap-
plying to permanent takings. Thus, the Court reinforced and strengthened the"parcel as a whole" test when determining what exactly is permanent and what
denies "all economically viable use." Although the Court had previously inter-
preted the parcel as a whole in a spatial or functional sense, here it looked further
and focused on the "temporal dimension" of property rights. 15 1 Conceivably, af-
ter the moratorium was over, the landowners' development rights would return,
albeit in a potentially more regulated environment.
A landowner's bundle of rights is affected differently by the three types of
temporary takings that have been identified by the courts: the physical temporary
taking, the regulatory temporary taking, and the temporary development morato-
rium. 15 2 One commentator illustrated the differences through an enlightening
hypothetical. 153 In the case of a temporary physical taking, imagine a government
official (perhaps in wartime) approaching a potato farmer and explaining to him
that his potato house will be needed to be used as a government storage facility for
a period of four years. The landowner in this situation is precluded from exercis-
ing any of his property rights over the next four years: the right to exclude, the
right to use, and the right to sell. This would clearly be a taking under the physical
appropriation standard. The next situation, a regulatory temporary taking, (the
type imagined in First English) would apply if a government decides to enact a
regulation that would permanently prohibit the farmer from building any potato
houses on his land. Even though the farmer retained his right to exclude and pos-
sess, he was denied the right to use his land and the market value would probably
decline given the permanent nature of the regulation. Thus, if the farmer can prove
to a court that the regulation should be repealed, he may be compensated for the
period of time that the ordinance was in effect. Finally, in a temporary develop-
ment moratorium, a government would tell the farmer that all development would
be halted over a fixed period of time in order to properly consider the impact that
sprawl is having on the agricultural land of the area. Here, the farmer still has
possession and exclusion rights and the right to sell remains; the market value of
the property value may not be affected because the moratorium is for a fixed pe-
riod of time, and there may be a benefit due to the potential of protected open
spaces around the property. 154
150. Among the parties that submitted amicus briefs on behalf of the landowners were well
known property rights organizations including The Pacific Legal Foundation, the California
Association of Realtors, and the Defenders of Property Rights, who argued that the Lucas rule
applied to temporary as well as permanent takings. See Brief of Amici Curiae Pacific Legal
Foundation and California Association of Realtors, 2001 WL 1082473 at *5, Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (No. 00-1167); Brief ofAmici Curiae Defenders of Property Rights, 2001 WL 1082462 at *10-I1, Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (No. 00-1167).
151. John D. Echeverria, A Turning of the Tide: The Tahoe-Sierra Regulatory Takings Deci-
sion, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11235 (2002), WL 32 ELR 11235, *8 (arguing that a landowner's entire
period of ownership should be considered).
152. Tedra Fox, Lake Tahoe's Temporary Development Moratorium: Why a Stitch in Time
Should Not Define the Property Interest in a Takings Claim, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 399, 417 (2001).
153. Id. at 417-19. The hypothetical that follows in the main text is adapted from the ex-
ample given in Fox's piece.
154. Id.
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Although the Tahoe-Sierra decision does contain strong, pro-planning dicta, 155
it also suggests that there be an important resource or need at stake, not something
menial. 156 Planners and environmentalists should thus temper their enthusiasm a
bit; although the Court determined that moratoria would not constitute a per se
taking, it essentially enforced what it has held all along. The Court explained that
the outcome to its question of "whether a temporary moratorium effects a taking is
neither 'yes, always' nor 'no, never'; the answer depends on the particular circum-
stances of the case." 157 Thus, moratoria should be adopted only when they leave
some economically beneficial use of property, and should be crafted to provide a
meaningful and finite period of time. 15 8 The moratoria should be tied to real data
and/or quantifiable public health and safety concerns, and should allow for the
maintaining of some ownership rights. 159 In fact, in an earlier case in which a
single property owner challenged the moratorium at Lake Tahoe, the Nevada Su-
preme Court found no taking as long as the restriction was for a "reasonable period
of time" and "the benefit received by the property from the ordinances [was] di-
rected and substantial and the burden imposed [was] proportional." 160
Thus, the Court properly determined that the "best" way to determine whether
a moratorium is a taking is a balancing of factors under Penn Central. Indeed, this
decision strongly reaffirms the principle that the sensitivity of ad hoc cases is, and
should be, the very hallmark of takings law. 16 1
B. The Reemergence of Penn Central
If there is one clear statement to be gleaned from this decision, it is that the
Court appears to have settled on a set of criteria to analyze takings claims. Penn
Central was firmly endorsed as the preeminent test for determining takings claims,
whether permanent or temporary. 162 The Court has apparently finally abandoned
its twenty-year-old project to create more lucid, prescriptive rules, and has largely
returned to the legal status quo created when Penn Central was initially handed
down. 16 3 Although the merits of that test were not reached in this case as it only
reached the landowners' facial challenge to the moratoria, the Court firmly el-
155. The majority opinion states that moratoria are "used widely among land-use planners to
preserve the status quo while formulating a more permanent development strategy. In fact, the
consensus in the planning community appears to be that moratoria ... are an essential tool of
successful development." Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
122 S. Ct. 1465, 1487 (2002). But see ORLANDO E. DELOGU, MAINE LAND USE CONTROL LAW:
CASES, NOTES, COMMENTS 407 (2d ed. 1997) (stating that "moratorium is seldom justified. It is
more often misused than used within its limitations").
156. Merriam, supra note 15, at 6.
157. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1478.
158. Wendie L. Kellington, Temporary Takings/Moratoria, SG021 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 105, 123
(2001).
159. Delogu, supra note 22, at 352.
160. Kelly v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 855 P.2d 1027, 1035 (Nev. 1993) (emphasis
omitted).
161. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 140, at 105.
162. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1483,
1489.
163. Echeverria, supra note 15 1, at * 18. Echeverria essentially argues that the return to this
status quo may create more confusion than clarity, since the application of Penn Central itself
has not always been well understood.
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evated Penn Central beyond just as-applied challenges as many lower courts had
been interpreting it; 164 courts had been favoring either the two-part Agins analysis
or a limited Penn Central test. 165 This past confusion due to the lack of direction
has resulted in lower courts crafting or proposing a number of alternative tests that
encompass parts of one or both of the Agins/Penn Central elements. 166
The majority embraced Penn Central in three contexts. First, by holding that
the District Court erred by disaggregating the landowners' property into temporal
segments and then determining whether there had been a deprivation of "all eco-
nomically viable use during each period," 167 the Court in effect limited the Lucas
holding. Indeed the Court in dicta went further than was needed to decide whether
a categorical taking had occurred and seemed determined to point out what Lucas
did not say.168 By defining the interest in property as the "metes and bounds that
describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years that describe the tempo-
ral aspect,"' 16 9 and then determining that the starting point in a categorical taking
analysis "should be to ask whether there was a total taking of the entire parcel; if
not, then Penn Central was the proper framework," 170 the Court has fully em-
braced the "parcel as a whole" concept. The Court has previously expressed dis-
comfort with the concept as applied to determining the extent of economic depri-
vation, questioning it in Lucas1 71 and again in Palazzolo1 72 only a year before
Tahoe-Sierra was decided. 17 3
This embrace clearly defines Lucas as applying only to permanent takings (as
a temporary taking would likely retain some future value). 174 As one commenta-
tor noted, after this reading of Tahoe, "few-if any-regulations will rise to the
level of a Lucas taking." 175 Even Chief Justice Rehnquist noted this effect in his
164. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 140, at 139.
165. See, e.g., Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (11 th Cir. 1992) (interpreting the
Agins second "economical deprivation" prong as encompassing the second and third Penn Cen-
tral "economic impact" and "reasonable investment-backed expectations" elements).
166. See Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (instructing the
trial court that after finding that a property has retained some value, to ask two further questions:
"whether a regulation must destroy a certain proportion of a property's economic use or value in
order for a compensable taking of property to occur," and second "what that proportion is"). Id.
at 1568; Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d at 1136 (proposing an eight-part test).
167. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1483.
168. Echeverria, supra note 151, at *16.
169. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1484.
170. Id. at 1483-84.
171. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
172. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
173. For articles that also express discomfort with the notion that the extent of deprivation
effected by a regulatory action is measured by looking at the parcel as a whole rule, see Richard
Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1987); John Fee, Unearthing
the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1537 (1994) (arguing
that courts must make decisions regarding the definition of a relevant parcel without exploring
the basis for their methodology and inconsistency, making regulatory takings determinations
unpredictable). See also Haar & Wolf, supra note 58, at 2199-200 (arguing that the Court in
Tahoe-Sierra, rather than rehashing the morass of regulatory takings, could have more construc-
tively addressed the issue through the progressive jurisprudence endorsed in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co, 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
174. Joel R. Burcat & Julia M. Glencer, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency: Is There a There There?, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11212 (2002), WL 32
ELR 11212, *10.
175. Echeverria, supra note 151, at *16.
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dissent, arguing that even Lucas may not have been decided in the way that it was
through this analysis because, "[s]urely, the land at issue in Lucas retained some
market value" since the development ban was amended after two years. 17 6
Next, the Court went to great pains to enforce the notion that First English
was solely a "compensation question," applicable only after a court first found that
there was a taking in the first place. 177 This finding, Justice Stevens pointed out,
must be a more fact-specific inquiry, which would presumably help to determine
whether a temporary development ban was a normal delay due to "changes in
zoning ordinances" and the like. 17 8 This fact-specific inquiry, much like Lucas,
must be conducted in the light of the Penn Central factors. 179 Although this does
not radically change the effect of First English, it provides some much needed
guidance as to what exactly a "normal delay" is. 180 Due to this past confusion,
First English has not been widely cited owing to a general reluctance by lower
courts to wade into this murky water, and a belief that the Supreme Court was on
its way to crafting a much grander story. 181
Accordingly, perhaps what Tahoe-Sierra affirmed about First English was what
the opinion was known for all along-temporary takings require compensation
under the Fifth Amendment. However, it rooted the temporary takings notion in
the context of all other regulatory takings; when a temporary government restric-
tion on property goes "too far" it is a taking. Thus, by returning to the "ad hoc,
factual inquiry" and embracing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Palazzolo that
"' [our] polestar instead remains the principles set forth in Penn Central,' 182 Tahoe-
Sierra may have taken a step further towards truly "solving" the takings puzzle. 18 3
Finally, by concluding that the "interest in 'fairness and justice' will be best
served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like
this," 184 this Court properly left the Armstrong1 85 principle unconstrained by hard
and fast indicia and set its inquiry firmly within Penn Central's factual examina-
tion of the particular circumstances. The landowners' attempt to infuse a tempo-
176. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1494
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 1482.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1483-84.
180. In his First English dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority opinion's lack of
guidance on how to determine what exactly is a temporary taking, and asked rhetorically if "the
Court has repeatedly recognized that it itself cannot establish any objective rules to asses when
a regulation becomes a taking. ... How then can it demand that land planners do any better?"
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 340 n. 17
(1987) (internal citations omitted).
181. See MELTZ ET AL., supra note 140, at 271 (suggesting that courts do not cite First English
more frequently because its remand essentially affirmed the well known Agins indicia); DELOOU,
supra note 155, at 58 (arguing the lack of litigation arising out of First English was due to a
general caution of governments to adopt cutting edge land use controls).
182. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1481
n.23 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
183. But see Douglas W. Kmeic, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 152-53 (1995) (arguing that the line of cases ending with Lucas
correctly has provided more objective standards rooted in the common law and in the context of
police power limits).
184. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1489.
185. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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rally segmented, temporary takings, per se argument with the Armstrong procla-
mation186 that the Takings Clause was "designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole," 187 was a tactical mistake and a clear over-
reaching. First, a moratorium will affect all property owners within the Basin, and
is thus less likely to single out an individual owner. 188 Further, because short
moratoria may in fact both increase property values and preserve natural lands
surrounding an individual's particular land,189 it is not clear that the individual
burdens will not be outweighed by the potential benefits. A per se rule would
remove the ability to ensure that equity could be achieved through flexible analy-
sis, which was the true desired outcome of Armstrong. Further, such an applica-
tion here would preclude the ability of governments to create well-informed land
use guidelines, which would likely result in hasty decision making by planners. 190
Surely, as Justice Stevens points out, this would be much "too blunt an instru-
ment" 19 1 and would limit the ability of government to ensure the public's health
and safety through reasonable land use controls. 192 If moratoria are crafted with
reasonable limits on a landowner's future use of property, if they have clear dead-
lines, and if they are enacted for a legitimate government purpose, they will and
should be sustained.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tahoe-Sierra Court's unwillingness to read the Lucas per se rule (a taking
occurs when a regulation "deprives land of all economically beneficial use") 1 93
together with the First English compensation requirement (if a temporary regula-
tion is found to be a taking) to create a new rule that moratoria constitute a per se
taking is a necessary and important step away from the current direction of takings
jurisprudence. This decision firmly pushes Penn Central back to the forefront as
the indispensable framework in which to analyze takings challenges that do not
meet one of the per se rules. However, even the Lucas rule itself has been weak-
ened due to the reemergence of the "parcel as a whole" doctrine; future interests
cannot be conceptually severed when determining what, if any, value remains on
the property.
The holding in this case, however, must be seen in light of its unique, extraor-
dinary facts. The national treasure that is the Tahoe Basin was in peril due to
intense development pressures, and Nevada and California created an organization
to ensure the integrity of the lake and region. If anything, this decision should put
planners on notice that moratoria, especially of this length, should not be used
lightly.
186. Brief for Petitioner, 2001 WL 1692011 at *34, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) (No. 00-1167).
187. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. at 49.
188. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. at 1488.
189. Id. at 1489.
190. Id. at 1488.
191. Id. at 1489 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001)).
192. Land use controls and regulations have been the preferred and arguably most successful
method that legislatures have used to control environmental and land-related problems. See
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 777 (4th ed. 1998).
193. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
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However, the Tahoe-Sierra case does not break any new ground; if anything,
it returns to well-reasoned but recently neglected foundations of takings jurispru-
dence. All inquiry still returns to Mr. Holmes's adage that "if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking." 194 Tahoe-Sierra simply suggests that to ask
how far is too far requires an examination of facts and a careful and flexible bal-
ancing, not any hard and fast rules. Only then will "fairness and justice" 195 truly
be served.
Philip R. Saucier
194. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
195. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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